Managing new product development process and project leaders for modular architecture development : Framework of two- stage NPD process and module leaders by Shibata Tomoatsu
Managing new product development process and
project leaders for modular architecture
development : Framework of two- stage NPD


























 Data Science and Service Research 

















Discussion Paper No. 84 
Managing new product development process  
and project leaders 
 for modular architecture development 
: Framework of two- stage NPD process  





Center for Data Science and Service Research 
Graduate School of Economic and Management 
Tohoku University 
27-1 Kawauchi, Aobaku 






 Managing new product development process and project leaders 
 for modular architecture development 
: Framework of two- stage NPD process and module leaders 
 
Tomoatsu Shibata 
Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University 





This paper proposes a new product development (NPD) process and new project leaders suitable for a 
modular architecture development. Based on theoretical considerations and an in-depth analysis of the 
common module family (CMF) architecture of Nissan Motor Company Ltd., this paper argues that a 
modular architecture strategy requires both a two stage NPD process and module leaders. This differs 
from conventional overlapping processes and heavyweight (HW) project leader. This NPD process for 
a modular strategy comprises two stages. First, the NPD process starts by the formulation and freezing 
of design rules. Second, concurrent component development activity. This sequence is mandatory, with 
a distinct boundary between the two stages. Formulation of design rules in the first stage requires a 
learning process, and an organizational arrangement promoting close coordination between technical 
and strategic views, enabling their integration. Also, to sustain the modular strategy, not only an HW 
project leader responsible for each product, but a module leader responsible for managing the modular 
concept are necessary. Otherwise, the modular strategy may collapse due to its fragility, even if started 
successfully. Based on these findings, this paper proposes the framework for an effective NPD process 
and project leaders in terms of product architecture.  
 









Despite increased attention to modularity over the past decade, an important area remains 
relatively unexplored. It concerns a new product development (NPD) process suitable for a modular 
product and project leaders required to sustain the modular strategy. In particular, the process of 
formulating design rules within the NPD process has not been fully investigated. 
Modular architecture with standardized interfaces among different components has shown several 
benefits, including cost reductions, flexibility and reduced time to marketing. These advantages have 
given rise to the tacit assumption, that the design rule for modular architecture has been specified 
beforehand. Actually, firms can only fulfill the promises of modularity if they can specify 
architecture ex ante (Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012). The design rule, which is critically important for 
building modular architecture, defines how a product is divided and the interface between divided 
parts (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). The development of subsequent components must proceed under 
conditions that follow the established design rule. Despite its impact, the process of formulating a 
design rule has not yet been fully investigated. This paper proposes a new NPD process suitable for 
the modular strategy, and should therefore include the stage of design rule formulation. 
Several automobile manufacturers, including Volkswagen (VW) of Germany and Nissan of Japan, 
have adopted the principle of modularity to meet local market needs through various combinations of 
modules. The goal underlying this major trend is to achieve both customer orientation and cost 
competitiveness in fast-growing emerging markets. 
Formerly, automobile manufacturers developed cars with integral architecture, the opposite of 
modular architecture. As integral architecture does not require a design rule, automobile 
manufacturers have not had to formulate design rules. At present, however, these manufacturers have 
changed their product development strategy, from integral to modular architecture, and they have 
gone through the NPD process for modular product and design rule formulation. Therefore, to 
address our research questions, the automobile manufacturers have provided useful observations 
enabling analysis of the NPD process, in particular of design rule formulation.  
 This study analyzed the process by which Nissan Motors developed a modular architecture called 
the common module family (CMF) and the design rules for this process. Based on an in-depth case 
study and theoretical consideration, this study attempted to identify an NPD process suitable for 
developing a modular product. This analysis led to our proposal of a two stage NPD process and 
module leaders, differing from the conventional overlapping NPD process and HW project leaders . 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature and the need to develop new 
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NPDs. Section 3 describes the research method. Section 4 illustrates the case of Nissan Motors, 
which have successfully adopted a modular strategy. Section 5 proposes a two stage NPD process 
and module leaders for developing modular products. Finally, Section 6 is the conclusion with 
managerial and theoretical implications. 
 
2 Previous research and position of this paper 
The present research lies at the intersection between NPD processes and product architecture. 
Therefore, we will first review previous research on product architecture, followed by a review of 
research on NPD process. 
 
Product architecture 
Product architecture has been defined as the scheme by which the function of a product is allocated 
among its physical components (Ulrich, 1994). Modular and integral architectures have been defined 
as ideal types. 
Previous research on product architecture since the 1990s can be categorized roughly into two 
groups (Baldwin and Clark, 1997, 2000; Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Robertson and Ulrich, 1998; 
Ulrich, 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Shibata, Yano and Kodama, 2005; Shibata, 2009; 
Sanchez, 2008; Sanchez, 2013). Several of these studies compared the benefits of modular and 
integral architecture, whereas other studies investigated the dynamism of product architecture from 
an evolutionary perspective.  
A common framework analyzing the benefits of modular architecture is based on comparisons of 
various examples of integral with modular architecture, such as changes in the relationships between 
product architecture and organization. This represents a static analytical framework, with previous 
research clarifying the benefits of modularity, including reductions in the costs and increases in the 
speed of development (Robertson and Ulrich, 1998; Ulrich, 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; 
Shibata, 2008). 
Much research in this category has emphasized the potential benefits of modular architecture 
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 1997). Modular architecture can be used 
strategically to increase product variety, improve speed to market, more radically upgrade products, 
and reduce costs of design (Baldwin and Clark, 1997, 2000; Langlois and Robertson, 1992; 
Robertson and Ulrich, 1998; Ulrich, 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Shibata, Yano and Kodama, 
2005). The mirroring hypothesis suggests that organizations should be designed as reflections of the 
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architecture of the products they develop (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Product architecture can 
then determine effective means of task partitioning and information exchange. Thus, product 
modularity can lead to modularity of the organizations designing and producing these products 
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996).  
An analysis of the development of multi-technology products, such as aircraft engine control 
systems, yielded results at odds with previous research on modularity (Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt, 
2001). Rather, to cope with imbalances resulting from uneven rates of development of the 
technologies of different components and unpredictable product level interdependencies, 
multi-technology firms require more knowledge than is required for manufacturing. Uneven rates of 
technological change in multi-technology products create a performance imbalance amongst 
components that may require an intermediate stage of integration; e.g., loosely coupled organizations 
coordinated by systems integrators (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001). These arguments suggest the 
absence of one-to-one correspondences between product architecture and organizational architecture, 
and that product modularity may call for highly interactive organizational arrangements.  
Regarding modular and architectural innovation, architectural innovation is defined as a change in 
the relationships between a product’s components, and organizations are built around stable product 
architectures. It has been postulated that the product architecture defines information processing 
capabilities, communication channels, and information filters within the organization. (Henderson 
and Clark, 1990). These contributions have highlighted the managerial implications of modularity in 
products and organizations. 
Other research was performed to understand the logic and evolution of product architecture. The 
computer industry was analyzed in detail to determine the evolutionary processes in this industry as a 
function of the complex adaptive system framework paradigm (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Several 
evolutionary tracks are created in an object with modular design, without the object controlling the 
evolutionary tracks. This is due to the individual effects of six operators (e.g. splitting) on each 
module, perhaps explaining the rapid and various evolutionary tracks within the computer industry 
after emergence of the modularized IBM System/360.  
Other research based on an evolutionary perspective includes discussions of a dynamic shift in 
architecture (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001) and of module dynamics (Shibata, 2009). These 
studies showed that product architecture moves gradually, from integral to modular, later returning 
from modular to integral after technical breakthroughs of the system. Thus, existing studies of 
product architecture can be categorized into the above two groups. 
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However, another important area remains relatively unexplored, identifying the optimal NPD 
process, including design rule formulation, suitable for developing modular products. Therefore, we 
will review existing literature on the NPD process and discuss the necessity of building a new NPD 
process for a modular strategy.   
 
New product development (NPD) process 
Effective NPD processes are characterized by overlapping process (Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986; 
Clark and Fujimoto, 1991), in which the same tasks are completed by multiple entities while 
information is shared among the various involved departments. 
In overlapping, the design specifications are not fixed during early stages of development. Rather, 
the final specifications are determined through close coordination among various departments once 
development begins. This process has been called the rugby style of development because, like rugby, 
the development process will be performed by multiple departments that share information and tasks.  
Leading companies have used the overlapping process to maximize reliability and delivery. The 
overlapping process requires an organization capable of managing complicated information flow 
among departments. Organizationally, Japanese companies have used a heavyweight project manager 
system to manage the complexity of information sharing (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Actually, 
Japanese carmakers have implemented internal heavyweight project manager systems using different 
names. For example, Toyota calls a heavyweight project manager a chief engineer. Companies in 
other countries have also tried to learn and implement these practices. 
Overlapping, however, is not always successful, with its effectiveness depending on the industry. 
For example, overlapping was reportedly unrelated to the product development process in the 
computer industry. Rather, technology integration has been found to affect performance in the 
mainframe computer industry (Iansiti and West, 1997; Iansiti, 1998). These differences are due to 
rates of change in the computer and automobile industries, with the former changing more rapidly 
and the latter remaining more stable (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). Overlapping is considered 
ineffective in the fast-changing computer industry, with speed of market changes being one factor 
influencing the effectiveness of overlapping.  
Aside from the speed of market change, this paper explores another factor influencing the 
effectiveness of overlapping process and HW project leaders. It sheds light on the importance of 
product architecture to an effective NPD process, and suggests an effective NPD process may be 
reliant on the product architecture, integral (non-modular) or modular architecture. This paper 
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proposes a new NPD process and new project leaders suitable for modular architecture. Through 
these considerations, we aim to advance the understanding of effective NPD process from the 
perspective of product architecture. 
  
 New type of NPD process and project leaders for a modular strategy 
In overlapping processes, design rules, including interface rules, are not fully specified or fixed 
during the early stages of development. Thus, frequent interface changes are likely to be made by the 
various component development groups. Conflicts among component groups over component 
interfaces are likely to become common. Management of these conflicts will require heavy weight 
(HW) project managers to play important roles during overlapping NPD processes. These features of 
an overlapping process are not suitable for the development of modular products. An overlapping 
process and HW project manager will be more effective for non-modular than modular product 
architecture. Thus, the development of modular products requires new NPD processes, including 
design rule formation processes, which differ from overlapping processes. 
Design rule matters for modular architecture. The design rule defines the division of a product and 
the interfaces among these divisions (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). For modular architecture, the design 
rule indeed matters, and formulating it requires a learning process. In determining how to divide a 
product system into modules, there are, in principle, innumerable choices. Thus, it is not an easy 
matter to determine the method of division, or the design rule of modularity, that will optimize the 
expandability and reliability of the system as a whole. Simply dividing the system into modules is 
insufficient. Many combinations must be considered when creating correspondences between 
functional and structural elements and in grouping structural elements. Accordingly, the selection of a 
method of division and certain combinations from among the available choices will probably lead to 
differences in product functionality and performance. Furthermore, the various individually designed 
subsystems must function well as an entire system after integration.  
Therefore, design rules must be formulated to optimize the overall performance and reliability of 
the entire product system. Companies must determine the divisions that are needed, as well as their 
interfaces, to effectively accomplish these goals. Therefore, the process of design rule formulation is 
a type of learning process, and learning about product design occurs in the midst of this trial and 
error process (Shibata and Yano, 2003). Thus, design rules will be established through accumulated 
knowledge, experience, and expertise of a company. The process involves organizational decision 
making as well as organizational learning. Only after completion of the design rule can the 
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concurrent developing of components commence. The task of design rule formation is therefore 
completely different from that of component development. The nature of formulating design rules is 
different from that of developing components concurrently. 
Therefore, this paper proposes a two stage NPD process suitable for modular products, where the 
stage of formulating the design rule is clearly separated from the stage of component development. In 
addition, maintaining modular architecture as the product develops with variation is a different story 
from commencing modular architecture development. Even if a modular strategy has started 
successfully, its continued effectiveness requires project leaders in addition to the traditional HW 
project leader responsible for each product. Just one HW project leader is insufficient for an effective 
modular strategy. Therefore, this paper emphasizes a shift of importance in project management style 
from HW project leaders to ML (module leaders) for modular products to maintain the modular 
concept in developing product variation.  
  
 
3 Research Method  
3.1 Case study and data 
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, a qualitative, in-depth case study methodology was 
adopted, enabling the collection of comprehensive data and the generation of theoretical findings that 
could not be derived satisfactorily from existing theory. The development of theoretical insights and 
findings based on case studies can result in initiation of the study as close as possible to the ideal of 
no theory under consideration and no hypothesis to test. 
Case studies have been shown effective in assessing the relationships between causes and results 
of business phenomena and their appropriateness from multiple perspectives and interpretations 
(e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettgrew, 1990; Yin, 1994). Case studies can provide deep insights based 
on objective qualitative information and researchers’ subjective interpretation of individual cases, 
insights not provided by statistical analyses. Case studies not complementing generalities based on 
statistical methods can help in constructing novel, creative theories.  
The case study described in this paper focuses on research questions related to the NPD process 
of developing CMF in a company. It provides in-depth analysis and observations regarding how that 
company developed a modular product. This case study of Nissan is based on the authors’ interviews 
with a number of company executives, including one board member and five officers, as well as on 
internal information and data (including corporate information in the public domain). 
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Five in-depth, semi-structured interviews, each lasting about two hours, were conducted during 
2012 and 2013. Interview data were complemented by follow-up communications via telephone and 
email. The case of Nissan CMF was constructed using data from interviews, published product 
literature, and Nissan’s technical documents. For validation, a draft of the case was circulated to the 
individuals interviewed, who made corrections where appropriate. 
 
3.2 Framework of case analysis 
This paper focuses on Nissan CMF because it achieved modularity between two companies with 
different histories and traditions, Renault and Nissan. It is difficult to promote modularity within one 
company, so modularity between different companies will be far more difficult and complex. CMF is 
an extreme case in this sense, providing the essence of the mechanism behind superficial phenomena. 
 The purpose of this paper is to identify and develop new NPD processes for the development of 
modular products. The framework of analyzing the NPD process for the CMF therefore has two 
viewpoints. The first is the stage of formulating the design rule, when compared with the stage of 
component development. That is, should there be clear boundaries between the design rule 
formulation and the component development processes? The second viewpoint is the organizational 
viewpoint regarding the process of formulating a design rule. That is, how should the process be 
divided among related departments and who should lead the process? 
 Based on a case analysis of CMF and theoretical consideration, we will build an NPD process 
suitable for the development of modular architecture. Modular architecture here refers to a closed 
module, wherein the design rule is proprietary within a company, as opposed to open modules like 
personal computers. However, the two are the same in that both require clear design rules. 
 
 
4 Case study: NPD Process for the Nissan CMF 
On February 27, 2012, Carlos Ghosn, the President and Chairman of Nissan, introduced the 4+1 
CMF to the media as a fundamental change to the vehicle design concept. 
“4+1” means four structure modules (engine compartment, front underbody, cockpit, and rear 
underbody) and one electrical module (electrical/electronics architecture), which are called big 
modules. The interface rules between pairs of big modules are formulated from both a physical 
standpoint (including position, dimension and form, collision safety, and the input/output of sound, 
vibration, and heat, among others) and an electrical standpoint. Each of these big modules has a 
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number of design variations for a mid-class vehicle, specifically two types of engine compartments, 
three types of front underbodies, three types of cockpits, and three types of rear underbodies. Thus, 
there are theoretically 54 combinations of these four big modules (2 × 3 × 3 × 3 = 54), resulting in 54 
different vehicles.  
 
In contrast, the electrical/electronic architecture uses one type of hardware and one type of 
software for all variable parts. 
The CMF was designed to generate vehicles with different designs and functionality, while 
promoting standardization, and to create an optimum balance between product variation and volume 
efficiency. If component-sharing creates significant cost savings, funds can be invested in 
environmental and safety measures, which will increase the competitiveness of this product in the 
future. Moreover, the application of new technology can enhance developmental efficiency of many 
types of vehicles, a process that has to date been applied only to luxury cars. 
Previously, automobile manufacturers standardized components used on the same platform 
(chassis). However, this approach has limitations. In developing the CMF, Nissan aimed to 
standardize components for different platforms (cross-platform), effectively eliminating the platform 
concept. In designing the CMF, components were classified not by platform but by the element in 
which the component could vary. For example, engineers could first consider whether weight or other 
elements should vary. In the former case, they would consider a basic design, in which components 
could vary by weight. As a result of the CMF, the compatibility between Nissan and Renault 
Fig. 1. Conceptual diagram of 
common module family (CMF)
Source: Nissan global site
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drastically increased, from 6% to 53%, based on the prices of the components, reducing component 
costs by 30%. This was considered more remarkable because it did not impair product variation when 
compared with conventional methods. 
The project of developing CMF officially began in September 2009, with the first year devoted to 
formulating the design rule. Once the design rule was established, the project shifted to concrete 
product design at the end of 2010. The first CMF-based mass production started in autumn 2013 with 
the launch of the new X-TRAIL. A total of 1.6 million vehicles, consisting of two types of Nissan 
vehicles, including the X-TRAIL, and 10 Renault models, were introduced to the market sequentially. 
The designs of all of these new models were based on different combinations of the five big modules 
of the CMF. In the future, Nissan will apply the CMF to all vehicles, except those that require a 
specific manufacturing process. The next Section describes the CMF developmental process and 
organizational arrangement. 
 
4.1 Establishing an interface between big modules 
Because the goal of the CMF is the development of cars using combinations of 4+1 big modules, 
one of the important design rules concerns the compatibility of the physical and electrical interfaces 
between pairs of modules, a process developed sequentially from September 2009 to the end of 2010. 
The physical interface includes the widths of the lower dashboard and floor, the points of installation 
of the air conditioning unit and the front seat rail, and the penetration position of the lower dashboard, 
among others. Similarly, the electrical/electronic interface includes assigning functions to the 
controllers and assigning controllers to a network, which triggers functionality, and the methods of 
supplying electricity to the body control module (BCM) and other components. These two types of 
interface rules were determined sequentially between each pair of big modules. 
One of the most important factors in this process is accumulated knowledge and experience of 
“simulation technology”, with the most difficult being the collision experiment. However, as Nissan 
has accumulated experimental data over many years, there is little difference between collision 
experiments using actual vehicles and the results of computer simulation, making it possible to fine 
tune designs once the big modules are combined. This high correlation between real and simulated 
data enabled collisions to be simulated, a process previously difficult to perform. This cutting-edge 
simulation technology contributed significantly to improvements in the design capacity of Nissan. 
According to Nissan, without the simulation technology, it would not have been possible to formulate 
a design rule for CMF. 
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The procedure used to formulate interface rules between big modules began by setting a target 
performance value for each vehicle. This was followed by changes in the boundary and synthesis 
conditions of the interfaces between the big modules. Simulations were used to determine the 
conditions required to reduce the interference ranges between modules as much as possible to 
achieve the vehicle’s target performance. Adjustments were made based on feedback and the 
simulation was repeated. These cycles were repeated until target performance was reached. 
According to Nissan, simply integrating the big modules will lead to completion of about 80% of 
each vehicle. 
4.2 Strategic issues of design rule 
While the interfaces between big modules were being developed, solutions to the strategic issues 
of design rule within the big modules were promoted. The most difficult issue was determining 
where and how common parts and variable parts should be separated within a big module, a problem 
that must be resolved by formulating the design rules for each big module. This is more than a 
technical issue, as it requires strategic considerations of various conditions.  
The first strategic issue arises from differences in market requirements; for example, requirements 
may differ in Asia and North America. Thus, there is a risk that sharing components sacrifices some 
market requirements. However, without component-sharing, it would not have been possible to 
efficiently manufacture an appropriate number of vehicles. This requires determination and 
promotion of the most appropriate level of component-sharing. Similarly, component sharing must 
avoid damaging the brand image of each model vehicle, an issue that arises even for 
component-sharing within a company. 
The second strategic issue arises from the differences in technical policies between the two 
manufacturers. Nissan calls its basic policy on the technology resulting from its accumulated historic 
experiences the Technical Policy. As both companies have different histories, it became difficult to 
judge which parts should be common to both and which should vary. In the case of CMF, the 
difference in technical policies became critical for promoting component-sharing between Nissan and 
Renault. 
For example, the design method aimed to avoid accidents and to ensure strength and the absorption 
of collision energy depended largely on each company’s technical policy. Similarly, each company 
had different policies for the placement of the AC compressor control. At Nissan, this unit was 
controlled by an electronic control unit, whereas, at Renault, this unit was controlled by another unit. 
This difference depends largely on policy rather than technology. Companies with different histories 
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will develop different policies, which are reflected in differences in design activity and the products 
themselves.1 
Thus, to promote component-sharing between Nissan and Renault, the differences in technical 
policies had to be overcome, in addition to resolving issues caused by differences in market 
requirements. These are beyond the technical perspective. Rather, they concern strategic perspectives 
related to prerequisites in starting design activity. Nissan termed an issue obstructing 
component-sharing a Road Block (RB). The CMF project formulated a basic policy that actual 
component developments could not begin until all RBs were completely solved. RB resolution was 
set as a top priority in CMF project. Figure 4 shows that the 859 RBs at the end of 2009 decreased 
rapidly within one year. 
 
4.3 Organization and Process to Solve Road Blocks 
Organizationally, the design department alone could not resolve RBs, because the technical 
capacity of that department was not sufficient for resolving strategic issues. Nissan developed a new 
organizational system, in which both technical and strategic (market requirement and technical 
policy) perspectives were incorporated to resolve RBs. Figure 2 shows the essence of this 
organizational system, which became a strong driving force promoting RB resolution and 
formulating design rules. The most important feature of the system was the introduction of both the 
technical capacity of the upstream strategic functional team (USFT) and the strategic capacity of the 
Joint Steering Committee (JSC). As the organizational system to resolve these RBs, the close 
cooperation and adjustment between the JSC and the USFT enhanced the role of the component 
design department.  
The JSC was tasked with resolving RBs at the General Management level of both Nissan and 
Renault, and appointed the appropriate team members to deal with the issue at hand. Various types of 
technology, knowledge, and know-how were required to solve the more than 800 RBs. Therefore, the 
companies established a flexible organization, enabling suitable members to come together according 




The USFT is a component design department that develops products and to which work was 
assigned relative to each component system, such as seats and steering. The total number of 
components per car was approximately 30,000, divided into 76 component systems, with one USFT 
assigned to each system. As each USFT has approximately 20 members, about 1,500 persons, all 
members of the USFTs, were involved in component design. 
In addition, the official reporting channel shown in Figure 2 contributed to resolving RBs. The JSC, 
in coordination with the USFT, provided monthly progress reports on RB resolution to the cross 
company team (CCT), a management team composed of executives, including Vice Presidents, which 
promoted RB solutions. Simultaneously, the JSC consulted with the USFTs about unresolved issues 
and other difficult matters, seeking direction in some cases.  
The process of formulating a design rule within each big module started with collecting as many 
issues as possible obstructing component-sharing from the requisite USFTs. Each USFT had strong 
incentives to promote component-sharing through the modular concept of CMF. 
The first step in promoting component-sharing was identification of the obstructing factor. All 
members of the USFTs were asked about impediments to standardizing the components and why 
sharing was difficult. By November 2009, this process had identified 859 issues obstructing 
component-sharing. These issues were registered in a database of RBs to resolve. The 859 RBs were 
broadly divided into four groups of problems; for example, those related to mechanical architecture 
or market requirements, and assigned to four JSCs. Issues related to components were assigned to 



































JSC #1, issues related to mechanical architecture to JSC #2, issues related to electrical/electronics 
architecture to JSC #3, and issues related to market and product requirements to JSC #4. Each JSC 
included six General Managers, three each from Nissan and Renault, and administered by the 
Alliance Directors. These JSCs were tasked with solving the RBs reported by the USFTs. As RBs 
could not be resolved only by USFT employees with technical capacities, the JSC tried to apply 
strategic perspective, such as market and technical policy, to RB resolution. If necessary, a JSC asked 
other department to collect new, experimental data and conduct additional market research. 
Effectively solving RBs required close cooperation between the JSC and USFT. The component 
layout issue provides an appropriate example. The body control module (BCM), which controls 
power windows, had been installed in different places in different model vehicles. This resulted in 
diverse types of wire harnesses, the cable used to connect the BCM with other devices in the car. This 
problem could be solved by aligning the technical policy about the layout of BCM, which would 
standardize the wire harness. However, the USFT responsible for developing the wire harness could 
not solve the issue of the BCM layout. Rather, the JSC, which has strategic perspective, led the work 
to standardize the BCM layout, making it possible for the USFT to develop a standardized wire 
harness based on the standardized BCM layout. Decisions about standardization of the BCM layout 
and wire harness required frequent information sharing and adjustment between the JSC and USFT. 
Therefore, Nissan developed an organizational system that enabled close cooperation and adjustment 
between JSC and USFT (Figure 2). 
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Figure 3 shows that the 859 initially identified RBs were resolved within one year. In this way, 
Nissan made every effort to resolve all RBs before starting actual component development.2 
 
4.4 Project leaders for maintaining CMF modular concept to all of market segment: 




After solving all RBs and formulating design rules in the first stage, Nissan started producing 
actual components and integrating them into each vehicle in the second stage. Producing a CMF 
vehicle requires a person to coordinate the combinations of these big modules. Combinations of 
multiple big modules must follow interface rules to ensure the integrity of each car for the customer. 
The person is called Chief Vehicle Engineer (CVE) in Nissan, corresponding to an HW project 
leader. 
 CVEs are responsible for the technical performance of each completed vehicle, and therefore 
focus on each vehicle type to maximize its value while differentiating it from other types. It is no 
wonder that a CVE might have a natural tendency to prefer customized components instead of 
standardized components to generate maximum performance and maximum value in their particular 
vehicle. In this way, the desire of a CVE to develop as much value in his car as possible may tend to 


















sacrifice component sharing with different types of cars, which must ultimately risk destroying the 
CMF modular concept.  
The first CMF-based car commercialization started in 2013 with X-TRAIL targeting C/D market 
segment. Until 2016, Nissan applied the CMF concept to market segment B and A beyond segment 
C/D, and introduced six types of vehicles sequentially. Figure 4 shows in detail that two vehicle types 
in segment C/D, two in segment B, and one in segment A have been introduced to the market.     
In 2015, two years after introducing the first CMF- based mass production car, Nissan established 
new posts of two project leaders described in Figure 5. Because Nissan noticed the necessity that 
keeping the CMF concept requires not only a CVE but also other project leaders responsible for 
managing design rules and component sharing beyond each specific vehicle in applying the CMF 
concept to other market segments than C/D. As shown in Figure 5, both APFL (Alliance platform 
leader) and ABML (Alliance big module leader) were additional project leaders to CVE 
corresponding to HW project leaders. To maintain the CMF modular concept, modularity needs to be 
managed in two dimensions, namely dimension of market segment and dimension of big module. 
 In 2015, Nissan created new positions tasked with the responsibility of ensuring maximum 
component sharing as possible in each market segment. Nissan called this position Alliance platform 
leader (APFL). There are three classes of CMF corresponding to different market segments CMF A, 
CMF B, and CMF C/D, respectively. Each APFL is responsible for managing modularity in their 
market segment. For instance, APFL for segment B is responsible for enforcing design rules and 
maximizing component sharing for not only Micra but Kicks in Figure 4. 
Similarly, in 2015 while applying the CMF concept, Nissan noticed a growing possibility that 
design rules and component sharing within each big module might be at risk of sacrifice with strives 
for product variation. So, Nissan introduced the role of ABML (Alliance big module leader), whose 
responsibility was to ensure the design rules were followed and maximize component sharing within 
each big module. There are four big modules in CMF architecture, namely engine compartment, FR 
under body, Cockpit, and RR under body. Therefore, Nissan established four ABML each responsible 




5 Discussion  
Although there are limits to what can be inferred from analysis of this single case, the wealth of 
detail available in this case should provide empirical findings relevant to the NPD process of 
developing modular architecture. Based on in-depth case analysis, we wish to discuss three 
contributions mentioned below. 
 
5.1 Two stage NPD process for modular architecture development 
This case revealed that Nissan first formulated design rules by the end of 2010 before beginning 
concrete product development. In fact, their CMF first established design rules, such as interfaces 
between big modules, and considered appropriate boundaries between common and variable parts. At 
the end of 2010, when the design rules were formulated through resolving RBs, Nissan started 
designing actual components. This NPD process was a completely new approach for Nissan, when it 
adopted this CMF project. Through accumulated experience and knowledge of past projects, Nissan 
had learned that conventional and overlapping NPD processes were not appropriate for developing 
modular products.   
Analysis of this CMF case and theoretical considerations indicate that the new NPD process was 
suitable for developing modular products. This process consists of two different tasks, design rule 
formulation, followed by concurrent development of components according to the established design 
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rule (Figure 5). This sequence should be strictly observed during the two stage NPD process.  
 The design rules can have a critical effect on the success or failure of modularity, since 
subsequent concrete design activities are constrained by the design rules. Successful modularity 
therefore requires that concrete product development begins only after the design rules are set. 
Changing the formulated design rules during the component development process will result in an 
open-ended development project and the consumption of management resources. This pattern of 
failure has been frequently observed in unsuccessful modularity projects (Sanchez, 2013). Therefore, 
a two stage NPD process should draw a clear line between design rule formulation and component 
development. 
During the second stage, the component development process, each component team will be able 
to focus its activities on individual components, without paying attention to other components. This 
requires the design rule to be fully specified and fixed, providing a stable environment that it enables 
all subsystems and components to be developed concurrently (Sanchez, 2015). Proposing this new 




5.2 Design rule formulation as a learning process 
In the two stage NPD process, the first stage consists of decision making about the design rules. 
Fig. 6. Two stage new product development process 
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Based on the CMF case, we will determine the nature of design rule formulation, followed by the 
organizational process of developing a design rule. 
As this case showed, the CMF project had to solve two kinds of issues, those requiring a strategic 
perspective for RB resolution, such as adaptation to different market requirements and different 
technical policies, and those requiring organizational technical capacities, such as simulation 
technology. Even if strategic perspective issues can be solved, excellent component-sharing will 
require the technical capacity to perform concrete product development. In contrast, even at a high 
level of technical capacity, excellent component-sharing comes only through the resolution of RBs 
from a strategic perspective.  
Theoretically, this paper suggests that design rule formulation needs more than a technical 
perspective. Excessive component-sharing sacrifices adaptation to different market requirements, 
whereas insufficient component-sharing does not produce volume efficiency. Therefore, design rules 
will have to balance market requirements and volume efficiency. This task cannot be resolved only 
from a technical perspective; rather, it requires a strategic perspective. In the case of CMF, there were 
two types of strategic issues, adaptation to different markets and adaptation to different technical 
policies without sacrificing volume efficiency. Design rules will therefore be influenced by two 
factors, the resolution of both strategic and technical issues.  
Conventionally, design rule formulation was regarded as a purely technical issue, resulting in 
development tools such as Design Structure Matrix (DSM), based on a technological viewpoint 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000). DSM is a design method to determine boundaries between subsystems, 
such as components and tasks, by focusing on the strength of interdependent relationships. DSM tries 
to minimize the complexity regarding the technical interdependence between subsystems, but does 
not consider needs of different markets. Therefore, DSM cannot provide the strategic perspective 
necessary for design rule formulation, requiring complementation by organizational arrangement. 
Understanding this nature of design rules, Nissan established a new organizational system to 
develop an effective design rule. Indeed, the CMF project has successfully increased the component 
sharing rate because of the design rule. Within the CMF project, USFTs do not have authority to 
manage strategic issues alone, because engineers were unable to formulate design rules due to 
strategic factors beyond their control. To resolve this issue, JSCs, with the power to resolve such 
issues, were established and staffed with General Managers from both Nissan and Renault by the 
Alliance Directors. The Alliance Directors are the highest decision-making bodies across both 
companies. The JSCs led the process of RB resolution, improving preconditions for 
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component-sharing. This organizational system was a completely new approach for Nissan, first 
adopted for the CMF project. 
The development of design rules requires close coordination between departments with a technical 
perspective and other departments with a strategic perspective during the first stage of the NPD 
process. Through close coordination and information sharing, technical departments learn strategic 
perspectives while strategic departments learn technical perspectives. The design rule formulation 
process is therefore a type of learning process to find solutions to problems through close 
coordination and adjustments between two different perspectives. Thus, design rule formulation 
process can be conceptualized as a learning and decision-making process.   
Furthermore, when formulating design rules, the involvement of engineers alone is not enough. 
Executive-level senior managers should be actively involved during the early stages of development. 
Senior members must lead the design rule formulation to resolve strategic issues. Moreover, the 
requirement for their active involvement for a longer period, beginning at earlier stages, constitutes a 
significant change from conventional development processes, where their involvement was limited to 
early planning stages.  
Clearing both the nature and the process of design rule formulation are the paper`s second 
contributions to existing research on modularity. 
 
5.3 Emerging role of new project leaders due to fragility of modular strategy 
 Modular architecture development requires the addition of project leaders different from the 
conventional project leader. In a conventional overlapping NPD process, frequent interface changes 
are likely to be made among the various component development groups. Conflicts over component 
interfaces are likely to become common. As existing literature shows, management of these conflicts  
requires heavyweight (HW) project leaders. An HW project leader is like a president residing over an 
assigned car, which means they are almighty in decision making of every aspect of that car. In the 
case of Nissan, the CVE play the roles of HW project leaders. 
However, the features of HW project leaders do not suit the modular architecture concept, because 
they tend to focus on improving the quality of their assigned car as much as possible, and may prefer 
customized above standardized shared components. This may ultimately lead to collapse of the 
modular concept, accordingly the modular strategy is fragile. To overcome this fragility, a modular 
strategy requires a person with responsibility to manage interfaces, enforce the design rules, and 




Actually, Nissan CMF has established new positions to manage the modular concept of CMF where 
interface rules and component sharing need to be managed through two dimensions, market segment 
dimension such as Segment B and big module dimension such as engine compartment big module. 
The manager of component sharing along with segment dimension is the APFL in CMF. In contrast, 
the manager of big module dimension is the ABML. The roles of the APFL and the ABML are akin 
to managing the interface rules and maximizing component sharing in each dimension. In this 
meaning, both may be regarded as module leaders. Proposing such new project leaders required for 
modular strategy is this paper’s third contribution. 
The difficulty facing new project leaders is that conflict will tend to occur between an HW project 
leader and a Module leader, because their roles and purpose differ. Who should have the most power? 
At least, a Module leader needs the same power as an HW project leader. Otherwise, the amount of 
component sharing might decrease and interface rules might change, resulting in collapse of the 
modular concept. The method of solving this power balance differs among automakers. For instance, 
German VW required HW leaders to sign a pledge to strictly adhere to the design rules. In this sense, 
module leaders are more powerful than HW leaders in VW (Nikkei Automotive 2016.1). Also, 
Nissan CMF gave the same power to APFL and ABML as HW project managers. Nissan resolve 
conflicts and make decisions, based on consensus building through dialogue and discussion among 
the three project leaders. 
 
6 Conclusions and implications  
In this section, we briefly summarized what has been found here and consider what kind of 
framework can be derived from that discussion. Then we conclude with its implication on 
management strategy.  
Theoretical consideration and in-depth case analysis of CMF have shown that a modular strategy 
requires a two-stage NPD process and module leaders that differ from a conventional overlapping 
process and HW project leaders. The first stage consists of formulating design rules and fixing them. 
The second stage consists of concurrent development of components, beginning only after the design 
rules have been formulated. This sequence must be strictly observed, with clear boundaries between 
these two stages. Because, the design rule formulation stage requires an integrative organizational 
process across strategic and technical perspectives, which is completely different from the nature of 
component development in the second stage.  Also, not only HW project leaders but module leaders 
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are necessary to maintain the modular strategy. 
 
Based on this knowledge and findings as a foundation, we can build a framework of effective NPD 
process in terms of product architecture, that is, which kind of NPD process is effective depends 
upon its product architecture. Existing literature identified speed of market change as one possible 
factor influencing the effectiveness of overlapping process and HW project leaders. Overlapping and 
HW project leaders can be considered effective in stable industries such as the automobile industry, 
and not effective in fast-changing industries such as the computer industry (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 
1995). In addition to the rate of market change, this paper proposes another factor influencing 
effectiveness of overlapping and HW project leaders, that is, product architecture. From this 
viewpoint, we argue that an overlapping NPD process must be effective for integral (non-modular) 
architecture, not for modular architecture. Developing modular architecture requires a different type 
of NPD process and project leaders from overlapping process and HW project leaders. This paper 
suggests a two-stage NPD process and module leaders as a new type of NPD process effective for 
modular architecture. Thus, as Table 1 shows, we propose a framework for considering an NPD 
process in terms of product architecture, which will lead to advancing our understanding of effective 
NPD process.  
 
Finally, we would like to touch upon the managerial implication of this research. Based on 
Table 1 Product architecture based framework of NPD 
process and project leader
7
Product architecture NPD process Project leader
Integral (non modular) 
architecture
Overlapping process HW project leader
Modular architecture Two-stage process 






discussion and findings so far in this paper, the change of product architecture to a modular product 
also requires changes in the NPD process. Nevertheless, many modular projects continue to utilize 
conventional, overlapping NPD processes. This continuation of conventional NPD processes can lead 
to failure of modular projects, because design rules may be changed during the component 
development process.   
Therefore, the success of product modularity requires engineers to observe a new rule, that, once 
design rules have been established, subsequent changes are not permitted. Some engineers may 
strongly resist this rule, because they are accustomed to conventional NPD processes. In 
conventional processes, problems with interface rules during actual product design are resolved by 
tracing back through the previous processes. The conventional process adopts less restrictive rules, 
with design activities beginning during early stages of development and any problems related to 
interface rules resolved through later collective adjustment. Engineers are accustomed to such a 
conventional development process, where design specifications are determined during overlapping 
from earlier stages. 
Managers must therefore convince engineers accustomed to the conventional process and resistant 
to change to adopt the new NPD process. The active involvement of senior managers becomes 
important, as they must explain to front line engineers the need to adopt a modular strategy and to 
change away from conventional NPD processes. Actually, in the case of CMF, the chief technical 
officer (CTO) played an important role in persuading some engineers who insisted on conventional 
NPD. To persuade engineers, senior managers need deep and precise knowledge on modular strategy.  
This paper has tried to clarify the NPD process and role of new project leaders for modularity, in 
particular the process of development of a design rule. This research is an unexplored area bordering 
research on product modularity and new product development. Further research is expected in the 
future, as this paper was based on single case study, that of the Nissan CMF.  
 
7 References 
Baldwin , Carlisss Y, and Kim B. Clark (1997). Managing in the age of modularity. Harvard Business Review, 
Vol.75, No.5. 
Baldwin , Carlisss Y, and Kim B. Clark (2000). Design Rules: The Power of Modularity, Vol.1, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Brusoni, S. and Prencipe, A. (2011). Patterns of modularization: the dynamics of product architecture in 
complex systems. European Management Review, 8, 67–80. 
 
24 
Brusoni, Stefano, Andrea Prencipe and Keith Pavitt (2001). Knowledge specialization, organizational coupling, 
and the boundaries of the firm: Why do firms know more than they make? Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 46, December, 597-621. 
Brusoni, Stefano, Andrea Prencipe (2006). Making design rules: a multidomain perspective. Organization 
Science, Vol. 17, 179-189. 
Brusoni, Stefano and Andrea Prencipe (2001). Unpacking the black box of modularity: technologies, products 
and organizations. Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 10, No. 1, 179-205.  
Cabigiosu, A. and Camuffo, A. (2012). Beyond the ‘mirroring’ hypothesis: product modularity and 
interorganizational relations in the air conditioning industry. Organization Science, 23, 686–703. 
Chesbrough, Henry W. and Ken Kusunoki (2001). The Modularity Trap: Innovation, Technological Phase 
Shifts and the Resulting Limits of Virtual Organization, I. Nonaka and D. Teece, Eds., Managing Industrial 
Knowledge, London: Sage Press. 
Christensen, Clayton and Raynor (2003). The Innovator's Solution, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 
Massachusetts. 
Clark, K. B., and Fujimoto, T. (1991). Product development performance: Strategy, organization, and 
management in the world auto industry. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.  
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management Review, 14, 
532-50. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., and Tabrizi, B. N. (1995). Accelerating adaptive process: Product innovation in the global 
computer industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 84-110. 
Fine, Charles, (1998). ClockSpeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary advantage, Reading, 
Massachusetts: Perseus Books. 
Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research, 
Aldine Pub. Co., Chicago. 
Henderson, R and K. Clark (1990). Architectural innovation: The reconfiguration of existing product 
technologies and the failure of established firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, March, 9-30. 
Hoetker, G. (2006). Do modular products lead to modular organizations? Strategic Management Journal, 27, 
501–518. 
Iansiti, M. (1998). Technology integration. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.  
Iansiti, Marco and Jonathan West (1997).  Technology integration : Turning great research into great products. 
Harvard Business Review, May-June.   
Ingvarsson Munthe, C., Uppvall, L., Engwall, M., and Dahlén, L. (2014). Dealing with the devil of deviation: 
 
25 
managing uncertainty during product development execution. R&D Management, 44, 203–216. 
MacCormack, A., Baldwin, C., and Rusnak, J. (2012). Exploring the duality between product and 
organizational architectures: a test of the ‘mirroring’ hypothesis. Research Policy, 41, 1309–1324. 
Magnusson, T. and Lakemond, N. (2015). Evolving schemes of interpretation: investigating the dual role of 
architectures in new product development. R&D Management. doi: 10.1111/radm.12142. 
Nightingale, P. (2000). The product–process–organization relationship in complex development projects. 
Research Policy, 29, 913–930. 
Park, Jin-Kyu, and Young K.Ro (2013). Product architectures and sourcing decisions. Journal of Management 
Vol.39 No.3,814-845. 
Richard N. Langlois and Paul L. Robertson (1992). Networks and innovation in a modular system: Lessons 
from the microcomputer and stereo component industry. Research Policy, 21, 297-313. 
Robertson, David and Ulrich, Karl (1998). Planning for Product Platform. Sloan Management Review, Summer. 
Sanchez, R. and J. Mahoney (1996). Modularity, flexibility, and knowledge management in product and 
organization design. Strategic management journal, Vol. 17 (Winter special Issue), 63-76.  
Sanchez (2000). Modular architecture, knowledge assets and organizational learning. Int.J.Techonology  
Management,Vol.19,No.6, 610-628. 
Sanchez (2008). Modularity in the mediation of market and technology change. Int.J.Techonology  
Management,Vol.42,No.4, 331-364. 
Sanchez (2013). Building real modularity in automotive design, development, production and after service. 
Int.J.Automotive Technology and Management,Vol.13,No.3. 
Salvador, Fabrizio and Veronica Villena (2013). Supplier integration and NPD outcomes. Journal of Supply 
Chain Management,Vol.49 No.1,87-113. 
Shibata, Tomoatsu and Masaharu Yano (2003) Building the concept of learning by decomposing: A case of 
numerical control architecture. International Journal of Innovation management, Vol.7, No.3, 371-393. 
Shibata, Tomoatsu, Masaharu Yano, Fumio Kodama (2005). Empirical analysis of evolution of product 
architecture.  Research Policy, 34, 13-31. 
Shibata, Tomoatsu (2009). Product innovation through module dynamics. Journal of Engineering and 
Technology Management, 26, 46-56. 
Siggelkow, N. (2007). Persuasion with case studies. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 20-24. 
Simon, HA (1981). The Science of the Artificial (2nd Edition), Cambridge, Mass; MIT Press. 




Ulrich, Karl (1995). The role of product architecture in the manufacturing firm.  Research Policy, 24, 419-440. 
Yin, R. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, second edition. Sage Publications Inc. 
 
 
                                                     
1 Another example is a different way of thinking about the layout, such as the arrangement of the engine 
room, seats, persons, and others. This is determined at the first stage of the vehicle production plan by 
considering various requirements, such as center of gravity, dynamic performance, under-floor arrangement, 
styling, and performance. This layout is often determined not only from a purely technical viewpoint but from a 
company’s accumulated knowledge and experience. 
 
2 According to Nissan’s estimates, if the component sharing rate is >75%, product diversity is sacrificed, as the 
vehicles will be too close in design. However, sufficient volume efficiency for common use requires a 
component sharing rate of 50%. Therefore, it is important to make judgments in design that balance the rate of 
shared components, differentiation, and investment within a component-sharing rate of 50% ~ 75%. 
 
